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microfoundation of the agglomeration economies.  By explicitly introducing the rural 
sector and multiple cities, we also show that the agglomeration benefits depend on where 
the new workers are from. 
 
Keywords: cost-benefit analysis; agglomeration economies; monopolistic competition; 
new economic geography; second-best economies 
 
JEL Classification: D43; R12; R13 
 
                                                 
* I thank the participants of the Urban Economics Workshop at the University of Tokyo 
and the Kuhmo-Nectar Conference on Transportation Economics at the Centre for 
Transport Studies (CTS), the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, for valuable 
comments and suggestions. 
† National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Japan; Graduate School of 
Public Policy (GraSPP), University of Tokyo, Japan. 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-21
 
1 
1. Introduction 
Many of the sources of urban agglomeration, such as gains from variety, better 
matching, and knowledge creation and diffusion, involve departures from the first-best 
world.1  The benefit evaluation of a transportation project must then take into account 
agglomeration benefits along with any direct user benefits.  A number of economists have 
studied this issue, and policymakers in some countries, such as the United Kingdom, have 
been attempting to include these considerations in their project assessments.2 
Based on past empirical work, urban agglomeration economies are substantial.  For 
instance, a review by Rosenthal and Strange (2004, p. 2133) summarizes the empirical 
findings as follows: “In sum, doubling city size seems to increase productivity by an 
amount that ranges from roughly 3−8%.”  Agglomeration economies on the consumer 
side are also substantial, as argued by Glaeser et al. (2001), with estimates by Tabuchi and 
Yoshida (2000) suggesting economies in the order of 7−12 percent.  Certainly, the benefit 
estimates could exceed 10 percent after combining production and consumption 
agglomeration economies. 
By modeling the microstructure of agglomeration economies, this paper derives 
second-best benefit evaluation formulae for urban transportation improvements.  
Venables (2007) investigated the same problem but without explicitly modeling the 
sources of agglomeration economies.  Accordingly, our analysis examines whether the 
results in this prior work remain valid when monopolistic competition with differentiated 
products provides the microfoundation of agglomeration economies.  By explicitly 
introducing the rural sector and multiple cities, we also show that the agglomeration 
benefits depend on where the new workers are from. 
Extending the Henry George Theorem to a second-best setting with distorted prices, 
Behrens et al. (2010) showed that the optimality condition for the number of cities (or 
equivalently, the optimal size of a city) must be modified to include Harberger’s excess 
                                                 
1
 See Duranton and Puga (2004) for a review of the theoretical analysis of various sources 
of urban agglomeration, Fujita and Thisse (2002) for the New Economic Geography 
approach, and Kanemoto (1990) for the analysis of a nonmonocentric city model. 
2
 See, for example, Venables and Gasiorek (1999), Department of Transport (2005), 
(2008), Graham (2005, 2006), and Vickerman (2007). 
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burden, that is, the weighted sum of induced changes in consumption, with the weights 
being the price distortions.  New Economic Geography (NEG)-type models of 
monopolistic competition contain distortions of two forms: a price distortion for each 
variety of the differentiated good, and a distortion associated with the number of available 
varieties consumed.  Although the former is well known, the latter has largely escaped the 
attention of the existing literature.  Importantly, because these two types of distortions 
work in opposite directions, the net effect is uncertain.  In this article, we examine 
whether we can obtain similar results with transportation investment projects.  Moreover, 
in yet another departure from Venables (2007), we explicitly introduce the rural sector 
and multiple cities.  We show that the results hinge on whether the new workers are from 
the rural sector or other cities. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2, we present a model of urban 
agglomeration economies based on monopolistic competition in differentiated 
intermediate products.  Section 3 derives second-best benefit measures of transportation 
investment.  In Section 4, we extend the analysis to a model of differentiated consumer 
goods.  Section 5 concludes. 
2. The model 
Our model adds three elements to Venables (2007): the microstructure of 
agglomeration, multiple cities, and an explicit rural sector.3  We examine agglomeration 
economies on both the production and consumption sides, using monopolistic 
competition models with product differentiation in the intermediate or consumer goods.  
The differentiated goods are not transportable to outside a city.  The economy contains n 
cities and a rural area, where all cities are monocentric, i.e., all workers commute to the 
central business district (CBD).  All cities have the same topographical and technological 
conditions.  Workers/consumers are mobile and free to choose where, between the cities 
and the rural area, to live and work. 
Our first model assumes differentiated intermediate inputs, where the production of 
an urban final good requires differentiated intermediate inputs.  We later replace the 
intermediate inputs with differentiated consumer goods to examine the generality of our 
                                                 
3  We ignore income tax distortions because Venables’ analysis is applicable to our model 
without modification. 
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results.  We assume the final good is homogeneous.  The final good can be transported 
costlessly between cities and the rural area, but, as stated above, intermediate goods can 
be used only within a city.  Final good producers are competitive within a city, taking both 
output and input prices as fixed.  We assume free entry for final good producers.  For 
simplicity, we assume the rural area produces the same final product, albeit with a 
different technology.  While the final good is consumed directly by consumers, it is also 
used in the production of transportation services. 
The intermediate good producers are monopolistically competitive.  We assume 
free entry for intermediate good production as well as for final good production.  
Following Venables (2007), we use a monocentric city model with commuting 
transportation and assume absentee landlords own land in both urban and rural areas. 
Production of the urban final good 
The production of the urban final good requires differentiated intermediate inputs 
only, and the production function is  MiiyFy  }{0 , where 0y  and iy  respectively 
denote the homogeneous final good and differentiated intermediate input i, and M  is the 
set of available intermediate goods.  Unlike in typical NEG models, we do not assume 
specific functional forms.  We only assume the production function is symmetric in the 
iy ’s, and that it is well behaved, so profit maximization yields a unique interior solution.  
The mass of the set of intermediate goods that are actually used for production (i.e., 
0iy ) is denoted by m and called the variety.  An example of production functions 
satisfying these conditions is an additively separable function, 
  



  100 )(m i diyfy , ( 1 ) 
which includes the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form commonly used in NEG 
models: 
  








 
1
0
1
0 )(
m
i diyy . ( 2 ) 
The final good, 0y , is homogeneous and its transportation cost is zero. 
The final good industry is competitive within a city and we assume free entry.  The 
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profit of a producer is  m ii diypy 00 , where ip  is the price of intermediate good i 
and we normalize the price of the final good as one (1).  A producer takes the prices of 
intermediate goods, as well as that of the final good, as fixed. 
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium where the prices (and hence quantities) of 
differentiated goods are all equal.  We can then write the production function of the final 
good as a function of the equal input level y and variety m: 
    ),(}{0 myyFy yyMii i   , 
where in the additively separable case   1))((),( ymfmy .  Because the first-order 
condition for profit maximization is ii pyF  /  for input i, this function satisfies: 
  mp
y
Fm
y i


 . ( 3 ) 
Variety is determined by the entry decisions of suppliers, but, in order for them to be used 
by final good producers, adding another variety must be profitable, so that: 
  py
m
F
m


 . ( 4 ) 
We will find that the inequality is strict in most cases.  The free-entry/zero-profit 
condition is: 
  mpymy ),( . ( 5 ) 
Combining ( 3 ) and ( 5 ) yields a familiar condition that the marginal product equals the 
average product in a free-entry equilibrium: 
  
y
my
y
my ),(),(  
 . ( 6 ) 
This condition determines the input level y  as a function of variety m : 
  )(myy  . ( 7 ) 
The demand function for input i can be written generally as a function of input 
prices: )}({ Miii pdy  .  Denote the number of final good producers by k.  Then, the 
market demand for input i is: 
  MipkdkpDY MiiMiii   ),}({),}({ . 
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Production of differentiated intermediate goods 
Next, let us turn to the producers of the intermediate good.  An intermediate good 
producer has monopoly power because of product differentiation.  Under the standard 
monopolistic competition assumption, however, a producer is small enough to ignore 
impacts on other producers and the number of final good producers.  The perceived 
demand function is then ),}{;( kppDY iiiii  , with variables other than the producer’s 
own price fixed.4  The perceived price elasticity of demand is: 
   iiii
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i ppy
p
p
d
ky
p
p
kd
Y
p
p
D



 }{;)(  , ( 8 ) 
where the elasticity does not depend on the number of final good producers k because it is 
taken as fixed by a producer. 
Production of an intermediate good requires only labor as an input.  The labor input 
required for producing iY  of variety i is acYN ii  , where the fixed cost and the 
marginal cost are fixed at a and c (measured in terms of labor units), respectively.  Given 
the perceived demand function, an intermediate good producer maximizes the profit 
)( acYwYp iiii  , where w is the wage rate. 
In a symmetric equilibrium with ppi   and YYi   for any Mi , the price 
elasticity of demand ( 8 ) becomes a function of price p and variety m: ),( mp  .  The 
first-order condition for profit maximization can then be written as: 
  
),(
1
mpp
wcp

 , ( 9 ) 
i.e., the profit margin is the inverse of the price elasticity.  The free-entry condition is: 
  0)(  acYwpY . ( 10 ) 
Because the number of final good producers equals yY / , the aggregate production 
function in a city can be written as a function of the quantity of an intermediate good 
produced, Y, and the variety, m: 
                                                 
4 This formulation assumes the Bertrand-type behavior in which a producer takes the 
prices of other producers as fixed.  We may use the Cournot assumption that quantities 
supplied by other producers are taken as fixed.  The same qualitative results are obtained 
in the Cournot case, although the values of price elasticities are in general different. 
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  )),((
)(
),(~0 mmymy
YmYFY  , ( 11 ) 
where from ( 3 ), ( 4 ), and ( 6 ) the aggregate production function satisfies: 
  mp
Y
mYF 
 ),(~ , ( 12 ) 
  pY
my
Y
m
mYF 

 ),(~ . ( 13 ) 
From the first-order condition ( 9 ) and the zero-profit condition ( 10 ), we obtain: 
  )1),((  mp
c
aY  . ( 14 ) 
Now, denote the total labor force in a city by  m idiNN 0 .  Then, because all workers in a 
city work in the differentiated intermediate good industry, the labor requirement for 
differentiated good production yields: 
  )( acYmN  . ( 15 ) 
Using the three equations, ( 12 ), ( 14), and ( 15 ), we can solve for three variables, p, m, 
and Y, as functions of N: 
  )(~ Npp  , )(~ NYY  , and )(~ Nmm  . ( 16 ) 
From ( 15 ), )(~ Nm  and )(~ NY  satisfy: 
  
aNYc
NYmcNm 

)(~
)(~1)(~ . ( 17 ) 
Commuting costs and urban land 
An urban worker consumes housing of quality h , which is assumed to be 
exogenously fixed.  We ignore h  as it is fixed, and for simplicity assume housing only 
requires land as an input. 
As in Venables (2007), we assume that urban workers do not receive a share of the 
land rent revenue.  The budget constraint for an urban worker is: 
  )()(0 zrztxw   for all ]ˆ,0[ zz , 
where )(zt  is the commuting cost for a worker living at distance z  from the CBD, )(zr  
is housing rent, and zˆ  is the city edge.  We assume that the rent is zero at the periphery of 
the city.  Note that commuting requires only the final good as an input.  In equilibrium, the 
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housing rent differentials completely offset the commuting cost differentials so that the 
consumption of the final good equals )ˆ(0 ztwx   for all workers in a city. 
The equilibrium condition for the housing market is  z dzznN ˆ0 )( , where )(zn  is 
the density of workers that can be accommodated at distance z from the center.  The 
density )(zn  is exogenously determined by topography and land use regulation.  Solving 
this equation for the boundary of the city zˆ , we obtain )(ˆˆ Nzz  .  Transport costs for a 
worker at the periphery of the city can then be written as a function of the population N 
and a parameter t indicating the unit cost of transportation: 
  ),()ˆ( tNTzt  . ( 18 ) 
Venables (2007) assumed  zzn )1()(   and tzzt )( .  In this example, )1/(1ˆ  Nz  
and 1),(  tNtNT , where )1/()1(   . 
Denote the aggregate transportation costs in a city (measured in terms of the final 
product) by: 
   z dzznzttNTC ˆ0 )()(),( . ( 19 ) 
Then,  
  ),(),( tNT
N
tNTC 
 . ( 20 ) 
That is, if a worker is added to a city, this person must be located at the edge of the city 
and the total transportation cost increases by the commuting cost of a worker at the edge, 
( 18 ).  We consider a transportation improvement project that marginally reduces the cost 
parameter t.  Its direct benefit, denoted by tMB , is a decrease in the total transportation 
cost caused by a marginal reduction in t, or equivalently, an increase in the cost by a 
marginal increase in t: 
  
t
tNTCMBt 
 ),( . ( 21 ) 
In the example of Venables (2007), these are  /),( tNtNTC   and  /NMBt  . 
Equilibrium conditions 
The total population in the economy is N , which is divided into n cities with 
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population jN , nj ,,1 , and the rural area with population AN : 
  A
j
j NNN   . ( 22 ) 
The number of cities n is assumed to be fixed.  As noted before, we assume that the rural 
product is the same as the urban final product.  The production function of the rural sector 
is )( ANG , where the wage rate equals the marginal product: )( AA NGw  .  The 
consumption of a rural worker is then AA wx 0 .  Free migration equalizes the 
consumption levels in all cities and the rural area, i.e., njxx jA ,,1,00  .  This implies 
net income equalization: 
  njwtNTw Ajjj ,,1,),(  . ( 23 ) 
3. Benefits of transportation investment 
We now examine the general equilibrium impacts of small transportation 
improvements in cities.  Our goal is to estimate the benefits of a marginal reduction in 
transportation costs in city 1, taking into account the effects on urban agglomeration. 
Price distortions 
Before examining the general-equilibrium impacts of a transportation project, we 
define price distortions.  First, the marginal social benefit of an intermediate good can be 
measured by an increase in the final good production caused by a marginal increase in an 
intermediate input: iY yFMB  / .  From the first-order condition of profit 
maximization, this equals the price of an intermediate input: pMBY  .  Because the 
marginal social cost is its production cost wcMCY  , the price distortion of an 
intermediate good is: 
  wcpMCMB YYY  . ( 24 ) 
The marginal social benefit of increasing the variety of differentiated goods is the 
resulting increase in the production of the final good mmYFMBm  /),(~ , and the 
marginal cost is the cost of producing the additional variety )( acYwMCm  .  The 
price distortion of variety is then: 
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  )(),(
~
acYw
m
mYFMCMB mmm 
 . ( 25 ) 
Substituting )(~ Nmm   and )(~ NYY   obtained in ( 16 ) into the aggregate 
production function ( 11 ), we obtain a reduced-form aggregate production function 
linking aggregate production to the total labor force in a city: 
  )(~))(~),(~(~ 00 NYNmNYFY  . 
The marginal social benefit of a worker in the differentiated good industry is then: 
  )(~)(~)(~
~
)(~
~
)('~0 NmMBNYmMBNmm
FNY
Y
FNYMB mYN 

 . 
The marginal social cost of a worker equals the wage rate w, wMCN  , and the wage 
distortion is the difference between these two: 
  wNYmMBNmMB YmN  )(~)(~ . 
Using the definitions of price and variety distortions in ( 24 ) and ( 25 ) and noting the 
relationship between )(~ Nm  and )(~ NY   in ( 17 ), we can rewrite this equation as: 
  )(~)(~ NYmNm YmN   . ( 26 ) 
Thus, the wage distortion captures both the price and variety distortions of differentiated 
intermediate goods. 
Harberger formula 
Now, we turn to the impacts of a transportation project.  We first derive a general 
formula that can be interpreted as an extension of the Harberger triangles to urban 
agglomeration.  Given that there is only one consumption good in our model, we can 
define the social surplus as the total amount of the good available for consumption by 
urban and rural workers and absentee landlords: 
    )(0 A
j
jj NGTCYS   . 
Substituting the aggregate production function ( 11 ), the total cost function ( 19 ), and the 
population constraint ( 22 ) into this yields: 
    )(),(),(~  
j
j
j
jjjj NNGtNTCmYFS . 
Our task is to evaluate a change in the social surplus caused by a marginal change in 
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transportation costs jt .  Totally differentiating the social surplus equation, we obtain: 
  j
jj
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j NdGdtt
TCdN
N
TCdm
m
FdY
Y
FdS  








~~
. 
Applying equilibrium conditions obtained in the preceding section to this equation yields 
the Harberger formula.  First, using AwG  , the equal-income condition ( 23 ), and the 
definitions of marginal social benefits, we obtain: 
    j
j
j
j
jj
t
jj
m
jj
Y
j NdwdtMBdmMBdYMBmdS   . ( 27 ) 
Next, the total differentiation of the labor force requirement in the differentiated 
urban sector ( 15 ) yields: 
  jjjjj cdYmdmacYdN  )( . 
Substituting this into the equation above and using the definitions of price distortions, 
( 24 ) and ( 25 ), we can further rewrite ( 27 ) as: 
    
j
jj
m
jj
Y
j
j
jj
t dmdYmdtMBdS  , ( 28 ) 
where jjt tTCMB  /  is the marginal direct benefit of a reduction in jt  defined in 
( 21 ).  This is an extension of Harberger’s measure of welfare change (Harberger, 1964), 
i.e., a change in surplus can be decomposed into the direct benefit and the changes in the 
excess burden, where the excess burden is given by the weighted sum of induced changes, 
with weights being the price distortions.  As noted by Behrens et al. (2010), the Harberger 
formula must be extended to include the variety distortion when the variety is 
endogenous. 
Using the price distortion of labor ( 18 ), we can simplify ( 28 ) as: 
   
j
jj
N
j
jj
t dNdtMBdS  . ( 29 ) 
Thus, the excess burden can be measured by the wage distortion only.  This result shows 
that the agglomeration externality measure in Venables (2007) is valid if it is obtained 
from a reduced-form aggregate production function with differentiated intermediate 
inputs. 
Benefits of transportation investment in a city 
Next, we consider a change in transportation costs in city 1, starting from a 
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symmetric equilibrium where all cities are identical replicas of each other.  Its direct 
benefit is the change in the total transportation cost in city 1: 1111 /),( ttNTCMBt  .  
From the Harberger formula ( 28 ), the change in the social surplus is: 
  

 


  111
1
1
1
1
1 )1( dt
dm
dt
dYmn
dt
dm
dt
dYmMB
dt
dS
mYmYt  , ( 30 ) 
where superscript 1 denotes city 1 and variables without a superscript refer to other cities, 
and we have used the fact that all the variables are equal, including the price distortions 
and the variety at the initial symmetric equilibrium: YY  1 , mm  1 , and mm 1 .  
Note that we attach a minus sign to 1/ dtdS  to indicate the impact of a marginal decrease 
in transportation costs (i.e., 1dt ). 
If we use the wage distortion, we obtain: 
  1
1
11
1
1
1 )1( dt
dNMB
dt
dNn
dt
dNMB
dt
dS A
NtNt  


   ( 31 ) 
from ( 29 ).  Thus, if a transportation improvement in a city increases the total urban 
population (or decreases the rural population, 0/ 1  dtdN A ), then there will be positive 
additional benefits.  A transportation improvement in city 1 tends to increase its 
population.  This creates agglomeration benefits in addition to the direct user benefits 
because the social value of an additional worker exceeds the wage rate.  However, this 
process also reduces the size of other cities, and the adverse effects on other cities 
(partially) offset the benefits in city 1.  If the population of the rural area (or equivalently, 
the total population of the urban areas) is fixed, then these effects cancel each other out 
and there will be no extra benefits besides the direct benefit: 11/ tMBdtdS  . 
Now, we show that the extra benefits are always nonnegative if the stability 
condition for population migration is satisfied.  Equilibrium within a city determines the 
wage rate as a function of its population, )(~ jj Nww  .  The equilibrium condition for 
population movement ( 23 ) can then be rewritten as: 
  )(),()(~),()(~ 111 ANGtNTNwtNTNw  . 
The effect of a marginal change in 1t  is then: 
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      


  11
1
11
1
)1()(~~
dt
dNn
dt
dNNG
dt
dNTwT
dt
dNTw ANtN . 
From the first equality, we obtain: 
  
N
t
Tw
T
dt
dN
dt
dN
 ~11
1
. 
Substituting this into the second equality yields: 
    NAN t
A
TwNGnTw
TNG
dt
dN

 ~)(~
)(
1 . 
Combining these two relationships with the population constraint ( 22 ), we obtain: 
  
)(~
)1( 11
1
1 A
N
t
A
NGnTw
T
dt
dNn
dt
dN
dt
dN
 . 
Now, one of the necessary conditions for stability is that if a random perturbation 
increases the population in all cities equally and decreases that in the rural area 
accordingly, the utility in cities becomes lower than that in the rural area, inducing 
counteractive population movement from cities to the rural area: 
  0)(~)),()(~(  AN NGnTwGNtTNwdN
d . 
This implies: 
  0
)(~1
 AN
t
A
NGnTw
T
dt
dN , 
and we obtain the result that the additional benefits are always nonnegative: 
  11
1
1 t
A
Nt MBdt
dNMB
dt
dS   . 
The additively separable case 
If the production function of the final good is additively separable as in ( 1 ), 
demand for an intermediate good by a final good producer, y, and its total supply by an 
intermediate good producer, Y, do not depend on variety m.  This can be seen as follows. 
First, in a symmetric equilibrium we have   1))((),( ymfmy , and ( 6 ) becomes: 
  yyfyf /)()()1(   . ( 32 ) 
This equation determines y. 
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Second, the first-order condition for profit maximization of a final good producer is 
  )()1( 10 ii yfyp   .  Because the output of the final good 0y  is taken as fixed by 
an intermediate good producer, the price elasticity of perceived demand ( 8 ) becomes: 
  
)(
1
)(
)()/(
iRii
i
i
ii
i yRyfy
yf
y
ppd 
 , 
where ffyyRR  /)(  is equivalent to the measure of relative risk aversion in 
expected utility theory.  Because y is determined by ( 32 ), the price elasticity is fixed.  
Equation ( 14 ) then determines the production level of an intermediate good as 
caY /)1(   .  An important implication of this is that transportation improvements do 
not affect the production level Y , and any change in intermediate good production occurs 
only through variety m. 
Because the total production of an intermediate good, Y, and the amount of an 
intermediate good used by a final good producer, y, are both fixed, the price elasticity of 
demand is constant and equals the inverse of the measure of relative risk aversion, RR .  
The price distortion then satisfies: 0 RY pR .  Although the price distortion exists in 
the additively separable case, it does not cause any excess burden because the output level 
Y does not change.  The variety distortion is 0)(  acYwm  , which is the cost of 
producing a variety multiplied by the returns to scale parameter  .  The wage distortion 
is proportional to the price distortion of variety and satisfies: wacYmN   )/( .  
Note that the measure of relative risk aversion RR  is the key parameter for the price 
distortion, whereas the returns to scale parameter   determines the variety and wage 
distortions.  
If we restrict the functional form to CES as in ( 2 ), condition ( 32 ) holds only when 
)1/(1   .  In this case the scale of a final good producer is indeterminate, but the 
aggregate production exists and satisfies YmY 1/1/0
   in a symmetric case.  The 
price elasticity is constant at   , and the production level can be solved explicitly as 
caY /)1(   .  Because in the CES case the returns to scale parameter   and the 
elasticity of substitution parameter   are perfectly linked, one parameter (either   or 
 ) determines all the distortions: )1/(   wcY , ))1/((   wam , and 
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)1/(   wN . 
4. Differentiated consumer goods 
This section examines whether or not the results obtained in the differentiated 
intermediate goods model carry over to differentiated consumer goods.  Another 
extension is to introduce a homogeneous good sector in cities so that urban workers have 
a choice between the two industries for their job opportunities. 
With differentiated consumer goods, how to evaluate the utility change caused by a 
transportation improvement becomes an issue.  Because we assume free and costless 
migration of workers, the utility levels are equal wherever they locate.  We want to 
evaluate a change in this common utility level in pecuniary units.  As is well known, we 
may use different consumer surplus concepts, such as Marshallian consumer surplus and 
compensating and equivalent variations.  The Marshallian measure has a well-known 
difficulty of path dependence.  As pointed out by Kanemoto and Mera (1985), 
compensating and equivalent variations yield complicated formulae in a 
general-equilibrium setting.  Here, we use the Allais surplus because it provides a simple 
measure while being consistent (unlike the Marshallian measure).  The Allais surplus is 
defined as the amount of the numéraire good that can be extracted from the economy with 
the utility levels being fixed at the initial levels. 
Firm i in the differentiated consumer good industry in city j hires jCiN  workers, 
where the number of firms in the industry is jm .  The homogeneous good industry in city 
j employs jN0  workers.  The total number of workers is 
jj
C
j NNN 0  in city j, where 

i
j
Ci
j
C NN  is the total number of workers in the differentiated consumer good sector.  
The homogeneous good is produced also in the rural area with technology different from 
that in urban areas.  The number of workers in the rural area is AN .  The population 
constraint is then A
n
j
j NNN  
1
, where n is the number of cities.  An urban worker 
earns wage rate jw .  All workers in a city work at the CBD.  Henceforth we omit 
superscript j when this does not cause confusion. 
The homogeneous good is either consumed directly or used in intracity 
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transportation.  The formulation of the transportation sector is the same as before, and the 
rural area produces only the homogeneous good.  The homogeneous good can be 
transported costlessly between cities and the rural area but the differentiated goods cannot 
be transported outside a city. 
The utility function of a worker is )}{,()( 0 MiixxUU x , where 0x  is the 
homogeneous good, ix  is the consumption of differentiated good i , and M  is the set of 
available differentiated goods.  The utility function is assumed to be symmetric in the 
ix ’s in M .  As in the preceding sections, we assume that the lot size of a house is fixed 
and we ignore the structural part of housing.  The homogeneous good is taken as the 
numéraire.  A rural worker cannot consume the differentiated goods and hence 0ix  for 
any Mi . 
The budget constraint for an urban worker is ),(00 tNTxdixpw
m
ii   , where w  
is the wage rate for an urban worker, ip  is the price of differentiated good i, and ),( tNT  
is the transportation cost for a worker living at the edge of the city as in preceding sections.  
The budget constraint for a rural worker is AA xw 0 , where Aw  is the wage rate in the 
rural area. 
In a symmetric equilibrium where quantities consumed are equal for all 
differentiated goods, we can write the utility function as: 
  )}{,(),,(~ 00 MixxUmxxU  , 
where m  is the number of varieties of differentiated goods actually consumed by a 
household.  Then, the first-order conditions for expenditure minimization yield: 
  mp
xmxxU
xmxxU 

00
0
/),,(~
/),,(~ , 
  px
xmxxU
mmxxU 

00
0
/),,(~
/),,(~ , 
and the compensated demand function as ),(~ mpxx  , where we suppress the fixed 
utility level. 
Production of differentiated consumer good i, Mi , is denoted by iY .  Consumer 
goods are differentiated and there is only one firm producing a particular variety in a 
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community.  Production technology is the same as before and the labor requirement for 
differentiated good production is acYN iCi  .  The profit of a firm is 
waYwcp iii  )( . 
Each producer is small and maximizes his/her profit, taking all the variables other 
than his/her own price as fixed.  The perceived demand function is then: 
  )}{,(),}{;( iiiiiiiii ppNxNppDY   , 
with iiip }{  and N  taken as fixed.  The perceived price elasticity of demand is: 
  iiii
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i ppx
p
p
x
Y
p
p
D


 }{; , 
where the second equality is obtained because a producer takes the population of the city, 
N, as fixed.  In the symmetric equilibrium that we focus on, the price elasticity of demand 
can be written as ),( mp  .  The first-order condition for profit maximization is then 
the same as that obtained in the intermediate input case, ( 9 ).  The free-entry/zero-profit 
condition is also the same as ( 10 ). 
The labor requirement for differentiated good production is: 
  )( acYmNC  , ( 33 ) 
and the market equilibrium in the differentiated good market requires: 
  ),(~ mpxNY  . ( 34 ) 
The production function of the homogeneous good is )( 00 NGY
U  in cities.  The 
wage rate in a city has to be equalized between the differentiated and homogeneous good 
sectors so that: 
  )(' C
U NNGw  . ( 35 ) 
So far we have obtained five equations, ( 9 ), ( 10 ), ( 33 ), ( 34 ), and ( 35 ), 
involving six endogenous variables in a city, m, Y, N, p, w, and CN .  These equations are 
sufficient to solve for the first five variables as a function of CN : )(~ CNmm  , 
)(~ CNYY  , )(~ CNNN  , )(~ CNpp  , and )(~ CNww  . 
The production function of the homogeneous good in the rural area is )( 00 NGY
A .  
The wage rate in the rural area is then )(' 0NGw
AA  . 
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Price distortions 
In the differentiated consumer good case, the marginal social benefit of a 
differentiated good is its marginal utility evaluated in monetary units, which equals its 
price from utility maximization: pxUxUMB iY  )//()/( 0 .  The marginal social 
cost is the same as before, wcMCY  , and the price distortion is wcpY  .  The 
marginal social benefit of variety can be obtained as follows.  Adding a variety increases 
the utility of a city resident by mmxxU  /),,(~ 0 .  Because all residents benefit from the 
introduction of a new variety, we have to sum this over all residents in a city.  Converting 
this into pecuniary terms yields the social benefit: )/~/()/~( 0xUmUNMBm  .  The 
social cost is the same as before,  acYwMCm  , and the variety distortion is: 
   acYw
xU
mUNMCMB mmm 

0/
~
/~ . ( 36 ) 
The marginal social benefit of labor in the differentiated good sector arises from an 
increase in variety as well as an increase in output.  An additional worker increases the 
production of each differentiated good by )(~ CNY   and variety by )(~ CNm .  The sum of 
the benefits from these two routes is )(~)(~ CYCmN NYmMBNmMBMB  .  The social 
cost of labor is the value of the marginal product in the homogeneous good sector, which 
equals the urban wage rate: wMCN  .  The wage distortion is then: 
  wNYmMBNmMB CYCmN  )(~)(~ . ( 37 ) 
This formula is the same as that obtained in the intermediate differentiated good 
case except for the number of workers CN .  Because workers in the homogeneous good 
industry do not involve agglomeration economies, we have to exclude them from the 
source of price distortions.  Following the same procedure as before, we can rewrite the 
wage distortion as: 
  )(~)(~ CYCmN NYmNm   . ( 38 ) 
Harberger formula 
Now, we are ready to examine the welfare impacts of transportation improvements.  
Because the utility levels are equal in equilibrium and the Allais surplus assumes that they 
are fixed at the initial levels, we have: 
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  UxUmxxU A  )0,0,(~),,(~ 00 , 
with a fixed U .  Total differentiation then yields: 
  0
~~~~
0
0
0
0




 Adx
x
Udm
m
Udx
x
Udx
x
U . 
Dividing the utility change by the marginal utility of the numéraire, and noting the 
definitions of the marginal social benefits of a differentiated good and variety, we can 
rewrite this as: 
  000  Ajj
j
mjj
Y
jj dxdm
N
MBdxMBmdx . ( 39 ) 
By definition, the Allais surplus S satisfies: 
   
j
jjAA
j
jjAA
j
jU tNTCxNxNNGNGS ),()()( 000 . 
Starting from an equilibrium where all cities have identical allocations, we consider 
changes in transportation costs, t .  Totally differentiating the Allais surplus and 
substituting the wage rates for the marginal productivities of labor, we obtain: 
      ,)()),(( 000
00
AAA
j
jj
t
jjjjjj
AA
j
jj
dNxwdtNMBdNtNTxdNw
dxNdxNdS




 
where we also used the result that the derivatives of the total transportation cost ),( tNTC  
satisfy ( 20 ) and ( 21 ).  Substituting ( 39 ) and the budget constraints for urban and rural 
workers5 into this equation, and noting NdxxdNNxddY  )( , we can further rewrite 
this as: 
    
j
j
C
jjj
m
jj
Y
jjj
t dNwdmMBdYMBmdtMBdS . 
Now, totally differentiating ( 33 ) and using the definitions of marginal social costs, we 
obtain: 
   jjYjjmjjC dYmMCdmMCwdN  1 . 
Substituting this into the above equation yields the Harberger formula: 
                                                 
5 Note that the budget constraints are satisfied at the initial equilibrium although in 
general they are not after transportation improvements. 
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    
j
jj
Y
jjj
m
j
jj
t dYmdmdtMBdS  , ( 40 ) 
which is the same as that in the differentiated intermediate good model.  Furthermore, 
using )(~ CNmm  , )(~ CNYY  , and wage distortion ( 38 ), we can rewrite this as: 
   
j
j
C
j
N
j
jj
t dNdtMBdS  . 
Because urban workers in the homogeneous good industry do not cause agglomeration 
economies, the wage distortion applies to those in the differentiated good industry only. 
Now, we consider a change in transportation costs in city 1, starting from a 
symmetric equilibrium.  Because the Harberger formula ( 40 ) is the same as before, ( 30 ) 
holds also in the differentiated consumer good case.  Condition ( 31 ) has to be modified 
as: 
  


  11
1
1
1 )1( dt
dNn
dt
dNMB
dt
dS CC
Nt  . 
The last term is zero if the transportation project does not change the total labor force in 
the differentiated good industry.  As noted earlier, only workers in the differentiated good 
industry contribute to agglomeration benefits.  An important implication for real-world 
applications is that because the utility level cannot be measured directly, it is difficult to 
estimate the wage distortion, unlike in the differentiated intermediate input case where 
the reduced-form production function yields the estimate of the wage distortion. 
The additively separable case 
In the symmetric additively separable case, we can write the utility function as 
),( 0 MxUU   with  diixuM ))(( .  In a symmetric equilibrium the utility level of a 
worker is ))(,( 0 xmuxUU  .  The price elasticity of demand for a differentiated good is: 
  )(ˆ
)(
1
)(
)(
i
iRii
i
i
i
i
i x
xRxxu
xu
x
p
p
x  

 , 
which depends only on ix .  In a symmetric equilibrium, we have: 
  )/(ˆ)(ˆ NYx   . 
Although the price elasticity does not depend on variety m, it does depend on the 
population size of a city in addition to the output level Y because it is determined by per 
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capita consumption.  Hence, transportation improvements change the output level Y, and 
the excess burden from the price distortion does not vanish, unlike in the intermediate 
input model. 
The price distortion of the intermediate good is proportional to the measure of 
relative risk aversion, as in the intermediate input case: )(xpRRY  .  The difference is 
that the relative risk aversion is not fixed in this case because the per capita consumption 
is endogenously determined by )(~/)(~ CC NNNYx  .   
The variety distortion is proportional to the difference between the average and 
marginal utilities xxuAU /)(  and )(xuMU  : 
   MUAU
u
xNpm  . 
Thus, the variety distortion depends crucially on the absolute level of utility.  As noted in 
Behrens, et al. (2010), this is an important difference between the expected utility theory 
and models with endogenous product diversity.  In expected utility theory where utility is 
unique up to an affine transformation, absolute utility levels do not matter.  In 
monopolistic competition models, the value of a new variety is the difference between the 
utility level with equilibrium consumption and that with zero consumption, which is not 
affine invariant. 
Because Y depends on CN , the price distortion of labor depends on the price 
distortion of the intermediate good as well as the variety distortion, unlike in the 
intermediate input case:  
  )(~1 CmYmN NYacY
cm
acY



  . 
 In the CES case with: 
  







 

 m
i dixxU 0
1
1
0 )( , 1 , 
the price elasticity is constant at   .  It is straightforward to see that the production of 
a differentiated good Y is fixed and the same as that in the intermediate input case: 
caY /)1(   .  Because of this, the CES assumption is sufficient to gurantee that the 
price distortion of the intermediate good has no impact on the excess burden.  As noted 
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above, however, additive separability is not sufficient unlike in the differentiated 
intermediate good case.  The price, variety, and wage distortions are the same as those in 
the intermediate input case: )1/(   wcY , ))1/((   wam , and )1/(   wN .  
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper obtained cost–benefit measures for the case where monopolistic 
competition with differentiated products provides the microfoundation of agglomeration 
economies.  We first examined a model with differentiated intermediate goods.  The 
major results in this model are as follows.  First, the Harberger formula for excess burden 
represents the extra benefits of transportation investment additional to the direct benefit if 
we include variety distortion in addition to price distortion.  This measure of excess 
burden can also be expressed by using a wage distortion that captures both variety and 
price distortions.  The agglomeration externality measure in Venables (2007) obtained 
from a reduced-form aggregate production function is equivalent to this measure. 
Second, an improvement in urban transportation in one city increases the 
population in that city but reduces the populations in other cities.  If the population of the 
rural area (or equivalently, the total population of the urban areas) is fixed, then the 
changes in the excess burden cancel each other out and only the direct benefit remains.  
Further, if migration between the rural area and cities is possible, then a transportation 
improvement increases the total urban population and there will be positive additional 
benefits. 
We next examined the case where agglomeration economies originate from 
differentiated consumer goods.  Most of the results in the earlier model carry over to this 
case but there are some differences.  First, because some of the urban workers work in the 
homogeneous good industry, which does not produce agglomeration economies, the wage 
distortion is applied only to workers in the differentiated good industry.  Second, because 
no data exist on utility levels, it is difficult to estimate the wage distortion.  One way of 
overcoming this difficulty is to use the approach taken by Tabuchi and Yoshida (2000) 
and Asahi, Hikino, and Kanemoto (2008), which relies on the fact that housing prices 
reflect, among other things, agglomeration economies on the consumption side.  Third, in 
the additively separable case, the output level of a differentiated good is fixed in the 
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intermediate input model, but it depends on the city size in the differentiated consumer 
good model.  Because of this, the price distortion does not cause any excess burden in the 
former model, but this does not hold in the latter model. 
There are two practical implications of our findings.  First, at least in a model of 
differentiated intermediate products, one can use a reduced-form aggregate production 
function, as in Venables (2007), to estimate the ‘wider’ benefits of transportation 
improvements.  Second, whether or not substantial agglomeration benefits exist depends 
on where the new workers are from.  If they are from another city with similar 
agglomeration economies, there will be little additional benefit.  Conversely, if they are 
from rural areas with no agglomeration economies, or from small cities with only small 
agglomeration economies, the additional benefits may be substantial.6 
Graham (2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b) and Department of Transport (2005, 2008) 
employ a framework unlike that of Venables (2007) in modeling urban agglomeration.  
These particular studies use the concept of ‘effective density’ to measure relative 
proximity to urban activities, as defined for each location using a gravity model-type 
equation; for example, the weighted sum of the number of workers, with weights 
determined as a decreasing function of distance.  However, even in a model of this type, 
we need to consider the adverse effects on areas that lose workers.  We defer to future 
work the analysis of a second-best benefit measure based on the microfoundations of 
effective density. 
If transportation improvements cause a merger of two cities, agglomeration might 
be increased without reducing agglomerations in other cities.  In order to analyze a 
merger in our model, transportation improvements have to open up the possibility of 
transporting differentiated goods to another city.  Using simulation models of this type, 
Venables and Gasiorek (1999) showed that the additional benefits are substantial 
amounting to around 30% to 40% of the direct benefits.  Another direction for future 
work is to apply the technique developed in this paper to examine the generality of their 
results. 
                                                 
6
 Agglomeration economies tend to be larger in larger metropolitan areas.  See Kanemoto 
et al. (2005) for an example of such a finding. 
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